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We use the HOSV model of trade to find out a link between corruption and the pattern of trade, 
not just its effect on the volume of trade. We prove that greater corruption in labor-abundant 
countries will restrict the volume of world trade while corrupt capital-abundant countries 
promote trade. This is caused by intermediaries who are engaged in mitigating the transaction 
cost of corruption. Relatively corrupt economy will export capital-intensive goods. However, 
relatively capital-abundant country will be worse off with increasing degree of corruption at 
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In this paper we attempt to model corruption as a labor-intensive activity within a simple general 
equilibrium framework and then explain the relationship between international trade and corruption. We 
argue that the standard HOSV framework provides some insights regarding such a relationship. 
Corruption is assumed to be a labor-intensive activity. Hence, as more labor is attracted to this sector, 
labor-intensive traded good suffers, so does the volume of trade for the labor-abundant economy. This 
shows that even if corruption does not directly affect trading costs, we can still have lower volume of 
trade. 
Our argument is drawn from a reasonable assumption that economic agents often have to comply with the 
undesired forces of regulation, intervention, rent-seeking activities. Such activities lead to the formation of 
a sector which takes care of such institutional hazards. Greater is institutional deficiency, bigger is the 
chunk of people who are there to benefit from the arbitrage opportunities, be it in the tax-office or at 
customs. These are the people who negotiate for political / bureaucratic special favors, arrange to jump 
the “queue” and engage in many other intermediations. This is typically a labor-intensive sector and in our 
paper it employs only labor. The lost value of output in each sector goes towards paying the wage bill in 
this corrupt sector.  Such highly labor-intensive non-traded sector draws resources away from the labor-
intensive component of the traded sector, strengthening the capital intensive component via the 
Rybczynski effect, thus affecting the extent of comparative advantage and volume of trade. We assume 
zero international trading costs associated with corruption and also assume away any intersectoral 
asymmetry involving the impact of corruption. 
The scenario in the paper is one where the labor-abundant economy suffers from corruption, but not the 
capital –abundant one. A corrupt capital-abundant nation is likely to trade more than under the usual “non-
corruption” case. Thus corruption leading to greater volume of trade is a distinct possibility. Moreover, our 
results indicate that there may be a case when in a labor-abundant economy exports are capital intensive.  
However, if labor is assumed to be immobile between production and corruption activities volume of trade 
as well as the natural endowment bias will remain unaffected due to a change in the degree of corruption.  
If corruption leads to the relative global abundance of capital-intensive good it hurts welfare of a capital-
abundant economy. Therefore, such a nation will always despise corruption, a reason grounded in 
economic reality without much of a moral connotation. Once engaged in trade the labor-abundant country 
may not mind being more corrupt. Since corruption leads to improvement of its terms of trade, our results 
continue to hold in an extended model with bureaucracy.  
SECTION I 
  
This paper attempts to restructure the neo-classical theory of international trade in 
order to find a link between corruption and comparative advantage. Such a link in turn 
also leads to an interesting relationship between corruption and volume of trade. We 
argue that corruption in labor-abundant countries will counter the factor endowment bias 
and will reduce the volume of world trade. If a relatively capital abundant country 
exhibits greater degree of corruption, trade will in fact get a boost. Equal degrees of 
corruption in labor abundant and capital abundant countries will not affect the volume of 
trade. 
In the beginning, corruption was considered as “grease in the wheels of commerce 
and trade” [Leff, N.H. (1964), Huntington, S.P. (1968)]. Some economists argued that 
corruption actually acts as signals for firms’ competitive efficiency. But “grease theory” 
has lost much of its sheen as more and more evidence come to light showing that 
corruption is in fact like “sand” than “grease”. Kaufman, D and Wei, S.J. (1999) tested 
the grease theory, empirically, but found no support in its favour. Subsequently, 
corruption has been regarded as harmful for trade, in particular and economic 
development, in general. In most of the cases corruption leads to an increase in 
transaction cost mainly through the problem of cross-border contract enforcement and 
naturally affects the volume of trade. Such arguments have been nicely elaborated and 
related papers have been surveyed in Anderson, J. (2000). Anderson, J and Marcouiller, 
D (2002) provide some evidence for the theory of corruption as an extra cost. They 
analyze insecurity in international trade related transactions and show that if the Latin 
American countries were as transparent as the countries of European Union, Latin 
American imports would have increased by 30 percent. This hypothesis is further tested 
in Jansen, M and Nordas, H.K. (2004). They learn that better control of corruption is 
highly significantly associated with an increase in trade volume. It seems by and large 
that the detrimental effects of corruption on trade are unambiguously accepted in recent 
times. Recently De Jong, E and Udo, E (2006) provide new evidence reconfirming the 




on trade flows. Trade is reduced the most if corruption is of chaotic type or arbitrary in 
nature. In this context Wei (1997) and Lavalle, E (2006) are also interesting papers where 
it is shown that corruption cuts back imports by the developing nations.
1 In a well known 
paper Trefler, D. (1995) convincingly demonstrates the case that the volume of world 
trade is much less than what is predicted by Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson-Vanek 
(hereafter HOSV) paradigm.  
Hence, it is possible that some of the missing trade is due to institutional 
complexities involved in international trade with the less governed and less transparent 
economies. This hypothesis is repeatedly tested over the last few years. However, there is 
no such theoretical general equilibrium model which tries to incorporate corruption in the 
neo-classical framework and explains the missing trade mystery. In this paper we seek to 
fill-up this caveat.  
In this paper we take a slightly different theoretical view of the problem. Usually 
corruption enters into the trade analysis in form of transaction costs when bribe is taken 
by government officials in the borders
2. And it is easy to understand that if contracts are 
relatively difficult to enforce across borders than internally, volume of trade will suffer. 
Suppose that this is not the case, such that relative costs of enforcement are the same 
internally or externally. In that case there is no special reason why international trade will 
suffer relative to the internal trade. However, if the traded sectors are affected more by 
corruption than the non-traded sector or if the exportable production is affected more than 
the import-competing good, trade will suffer. We abstract from all such examples of 
differential effect of corruption and focus on the neutral impact of corruption on two traded 
goods in a standard neo- classical model.  This should be noted as a very natural 
extension of the standard general equilibrium trade theory. If a country, otherwise 
characterized by the attributes of a neo-classical world, is affected by corruption which 
eats away the output in each sector without any relative bias, will that affect the degree of 
comparative advantage and volume of trade?  
Corruption in our framework diverts labor from productive to corruptive 
activities. This clue is taken from Bhagwati, J (1982) and Shleifer,A. and Vishny, R. 
(1993). Corruption is viewed in Bhagwati (1982) as DUP activity as many people 




as middlemen and intermediaries. Such diversion of human talent can be quite costly for 
the society and thus is related to the ideas of Shleifer and Vishny (1993). If relatively 
labor-abundant countries are those affected by corruption, an undeniable empirical fact 
given whatever data we have on inter-country measures of corruption [Mauro, P. (1995), 
Lavalle (2006) etc.] the volume of world trade will shrink. Very recently Roy, S. (2007) 
made an attempt to show whether corruption is anti-labor. Roy tried to examine the end 
product of corruption on trade-openness in both low and high-income countries. His 
paper, an empirical one, essentially corroborates our theoretical idea. We argue why 
corruption should affect comparative advantage and volume of trade simultaneously. It is 
beyond the notion of insecurity of transactions involving international trade or relative 
damage caused by corruption to the traded sectors. According the arguments developed 
in the paper, corruption in capital-abundant countries should promote trade. If in reality 
we do not observe much corruption in relatively capital abundant nations and we 
experience more of this in the labor-abundant countries, then our framework will predict 
lower volume of world trade. 
Our argument is drawn from a reasonable assumption that economic agents often 
have to comply with the undesired forces of regulation, intervention, rent-seeking and 
corruption. Such activities lead to the emergence of a sector represented by a group of 
people which takes care of such institutional hazards. Greater is institutional deficiency, 
bigger is the chunk of people who are there to benefit from the arbitrage opportunities, be 
it in the tax-office or at customs. These are the people who negotiate for political / 
bureaucratic special favors, arrange to jump the “queue” and engage in many other 
intermediations.
3 The transaction costs due to corruption are essentially spending to 
sustain this non-traded sector. Even without  explicit taxes, tiding over regulatory 
complexities implies employing people who will take care of the institutional problems. 
This is typically a labor-intensive sector and in our paper it employs only labor. The lost 
value of output in each sector goes towards paying the wage bill in this non-traded sector.  
If the entire workforce absorbed in the non-traded sector were unemployed had there 
been no such sector, it would not have mattered much for the traded sectors. But this may 
not be the case. Such highly labor-intensive non-traded sector draws resources away from 




component via the Rybczynski effect, thus affecting the extent of comparative advantage 
and volume of trade. We assume zero international trading costs associated with 
corruption, so that the adverse impact, if any, on the volume of trade is generated through 
restricting the factor endowment bias. We also assume away any intersectoral asymmetry 
involving the impact of corruption. 
The arrangement of the paper is as follows. Introduction is followed by the 
benchmark model in section II. Section III introduces the government sector explicitly 
and generalizes the results derived in the benchmark model. The last section concludes.  
However, the mathematical details and proofs of propositions are relegated to Appendix. 
 
SECTION II 
The Benchmark Model 
With this backdrop let us consider a world economy consisting of two economies: 
a home and a foreign economy. The variables of the foreign economy are denoted by 
asterisk. Foreign economy is considered in order to gauge the difference in relative price 
of foreign with that of home when degree of corruption changes in the home front. Our 
main focus is on the home economy. 
Home economy is considered to be a perfectly competitive one producing two 
tradeable goods, capital-intensive good X and labor-intensive good Y. The major portion 
of the total labor force is absorbed in X and Y production, and others get employment due 
to institutional complexities involved in licensing and international trade. These 
institutional complexities give rise to corruption. Nevertheless, this service is not free of 
cost. α  is the fraction of  each good X and Y lost due to  corruption. Therefore, α [PXX + 
PYY] represents the maximum total value of the goods that can be spent on those who are 
in a position to manipulate the system and recover the booty. Let Z represent the sector 
and  LZ, the people who are exclusively engaged in such operations. We assume 
competitive market for corruption to be consistent with the otherwise standard 
specifications of the competitive general equilibrium model. 
Foreign economy is characterized by similar variables. However, it is corruption 




functions for X and Y are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale and diminishing 
marginal productivity. 
So the structure we have, here, is the standard Jonesian [Jones (1965)] 
specification of 2x2 neo-classical general equilibrium model. The symbols and basic 
equations are in consistence with Jones (1965). 
To build the system of equations, we use following notations: 
Pi = Price of i
th good, i = X,Y   
w = Return to labour 
r = Return to capital, K 
ij a = Technological co-efficient 
K  = Total supply of capital 
L  = Total supply of labour 
Lz = Labor engaged in corruption activities 
Therefore, the general equilibrium structure is like the following one: 
(1)            () z Y X wL Y P X P = + α                                                         
 where,   [] 1 , 0 ∈ α ; α  depends on the strength of institutional regime. A low α will mean 
low corruption/ strong institution and conversely.      
Competitive price conditions are: 
(2)         () α − = + 1 . . X P a r a w KX LX                                                            
(3)     () α − = + 1 . . Y P a r a w KY LY                                 
Full employment conditions are: 
(4)  Y a X a LY LX . . + = L - Lz                          
(5)  K Y a X a KY KX = + . .               
Thus the structure of the model is over. Now let us try to solve for the unknown 
variables. Factor endowments of labor and capital are constant at  , L   K . Given (α, PX, 
PY)  wand r can be determined from equation (2) and (3). Now, let us start from some Lz 
such that 0 ) ( > − Lz L . Then, given ( , wr ) and hence aijs( ij a is constant because of CRS) 
and with a given value of Lz  we can solve for X and Y from equation (4) and (5). If we 
increase Lz, because of Rybczynski effect production of   X will expand while that of Y 




Let us consider Y as the numeraire commodity and set   P PX = . So, equation (1) 
becomes, 
(6)      α(Ρ. Χ +Υ) =w Lz                                 
  We can close the model by incorporating a homothetic demand function. This is, 





                         
  Here XD and YD signifies demand for respective commodities. 
 
Note that, given P with an increase in Lz, (Ρ. Χ +Υ) does not change due to familiar 
envelope property. 
(8)         0 . ) . ( = + = + K rd L d w dY dX P                                                               
 
Hence, LHS in (1) is constant. With w determined, the RHS is linear in LZ. Hence, 
we have   figure -1 where LZ0 is determined. Now with LZ0 we can determine everything 








. Note that sector Z enters as non-traded 
sector along with 2X2 HOS system. Activity in sector Z becomes “complementary” to X, 
the capital-intensive sector as Z turns out to be the most labor-intensive one. 
 
SECTION II.A 
Change in Price 
With a rise in P, w will fall and r will go up as per the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem. Given LZ, this will make the labor constraint more and capital constraint less 
binding. Hence due to Rybczynski theorem X will go up and Y will go down 
4.  
Now, let us look at (6). RHS in figure-1 will rotate downward since w is lower 
and Lz is given. Note that due to the envelope property and also for the fact that ‘α’ is the 
same for both sectors, change in (PX+Y) will be approximated by dP.X which is greater 
than zero since P rises (as PdX + dY = 0) . Hence, the LHS in figure-1 will move upward. 













homothetic demand function we can close the model and can determine the equilibrium 
value of P. 
Figure-2 gives us the equilibrium autarkic price PA. 
Our motive is to verify the impact of α on effective factor abundance and 
ultimately on autarkic price which in turn affects the volume of trade. For that purpose let 
us introduce a foreign economy, represented by ‘*’. Say both domestic and foreign 
economies are similar in technology and preference. But the difference lies in factor 
endowments. Let the foreign economy be capital abundant. Hence,              
     (9)                                            (K/L)
* > (K/L)                                           
For simplicity let us assume the foreign economy to be corruption free, i.e.α *= 0. 
When both the nations are corruption free, according to HOSV prediction, for a given P,  
                                                 (X/Y)
* > (X/Y). 
This implies, PA
*<PA (‘A’ denotes autarkic situation). It is apparent that greater is 
the difference between (K/L)
* and (K/L) bigger will be the volume of trade or the size of 
so called “trade triangle”. 
 
SECTION II.B 
Change in the degree of corruption in home front 
Suppose there is a change in α , α rises in the home country owing to some 
institutional problems. Therefore (1-α) falls in the home, the labor-abundant country. 
Note that from (2) and (3) given P there will be symmetric response in both the price 









does not change. However, there are two effects on LHS in (6). Given (P.X+Y), an 
increase in α has increased LHS. But as w and r fall, value of national income goes down. 
Hence given α, LHS should go down.  The negative effect will vanish if we start from 
zero level of corruption. To keep things simple we shall assume that initially α=0 
5. Then 
the RHS falls at a given Lz as w falls. Therefore, Lz  must increase lowering Y and 





























price gap (PA – PA*) will also shrink and so will be the volume of trade. This is clearly 
demonstrated in figure-2.  
Now, the degree of effective capital abundance in the labor-abundant country 
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Therefore as α rises in a labor abundant country its effective capital abundance is 
strengthened. It is also to be noted that there is no presumption as to which sector is more 
affected by corruption with α being the same for both X and Y. But as corruption is a 
labor-intensive activity, the labor-abundant country suffers in terms of the good over 
which it has a comparative advantage. The message is that people, who could otherwise 
be involved in producing Y, are being engaged in illegal activities. Therefore, the 
corruption induced bias goes against the factor-endowment bias for a relatively labor-
abundant country. Due to the same reason for a capital-abundant country corruption will 
reinforce the endowment bias. While many papers talk about how corruption can raise 
trading costs and hence adversely affect the volume of trade, it is not clear how 
corruption actually affects the pattern of comparative advantage. If corruption is a labor-
intensive activity, it is definitely going to compete with other labor-intensive activities. 
That is how an increase in α affects the pattern of comparative advantage and volume of 
trade. 
So we make the following propositions. 
PROPOSITION I : Labor-abundant country’s natural endowment bias is countered by 
corruption bias whereas it is further strengthened in capital-abundant country. And if 
two countries have similar endowment trade will be determined by relative degree of 
corruption. 
                                                                               
   (11)   
Proof: See appendix A for detailed mathematical proof. 
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PROPOSITION II : An increase in the degree of corruption in a labor-abundant 
economy leads to lowering its volume of trade while it enhances the trade volume 
for  capital-abundant country. 
   
(12) 
      
      Proof: See appendix A. 
 
 So far we have not explicitly stated the welfare consequences of introducing 
corruption in the standard general equilibrium model. Having a leakage in the form of 
corruption entails inefficiency of some sort. Corruption acts as a tax on the labor-
intensive sector. In the first best situation the economy should have produced more of the 
labor-intensive good. If the labor-abundant country wishes to engage in trade, corruption 
will restrict volume of trade and therefore the extent of the gains from trade will be 
affected. Thus the welfare loss is reinforced. Higher degree of corruption in a labor–
abundant country will be harmful to the capital-abundant country since higher output of 
capital intensive good will depress world price of that good, causing a terms of trade loss 
for the capital-abundant country. In fact under free trade the capital-abundant economy 
will be worse off with increasing corruption at home and abroad. Interestingly once 
engaged in trade, the labor-abundant economy actually gains from further corruption, 
through an improvement in the terms of trade. But the inefficiency effect will also be 
strengthened. However, we may have a case where the labor-abundant country in the 
post-trade situation can gain from corruption with a strong enough terms of trade effect.
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   In the next section we talk about a scenario where corruption may be considered 
as an endogenous factor. It is not insensible to think of endogenizing corruption because 






















The Extended Model: Endogenous Corruption 
The benchmark model we have discussed so far has one major restriction as α is 
exogenous. In this section, we treat α as a variable which depends on the size of the 
government or bureaucracy. Lg denotes the size of the government or bureaucracy which 
may facilitate productive activity through the proper provisioning of public services. But 
at the same time regulations and complex layers of decision making may increase 
transaction costs and induce corruption. Thus  
Lg  can affect  α either way. We start from a situation where 
  (13)    α =  α (Lg) ,  α′ >0                                         
We also assume that for  α (Lg)  lost in the process only βα (Lg)  is recovered, 
0<β<1. Therefore, (1-β)α (Lg)  is the cost due to corruption which cannot be recovered. 
βα (Lg)   is recovered but is spent away towards payments to the bureaucrat and fees to 
the intermediaries. The Z sector’s balancing condition looks as follows. 
 
(14)   βα (Lg)  [PX+Y] = [w+wb(Lz)] Lg + w.Lz  ,    wb′ <0             
 
Note that we now have wb as the “rent” enjoyed by those powerful in the 
government to affect productive activities. One can interpret βα (Lg)  [PX+Y] as tax 
revenue and bribe money. The bribe goes to pay the premium wb which depends on Lz. 
Employing greater number as of intermediaries means economizing on paying the 
premium. 
 
   Note that each member in the group Lg earns (w+wb) . Therefore, everyone would 
like a government job since it pays a premium on top of w. To motivate on comparative 
static results we assume Lg  is determined by a government quota. We have stated earlier, 
Lg can negatively affect α when public services help reduce transaction costs. Higher Lg 
may intensify the transaction cost as well. In both cases, one can justify a premium wb. In 




production process. When higher Lg increases α, bribe needs to be paid for avoiding 
harassment. 
   Given Lg, one can determine all the variables. We proceed exactly in the same 
fashion as in the benchmark model. Let us start from a given P, we can determine w, r 
from the competitive cost conditions. Then equation (14) determines Lz. Note that given 
P, (PX+Y) is independent of  Lz. Then given Lz , we can solve for X and Y. As earlier we 
assume initially Lg is zero and β  is unity so that the inefficiency effect on the payment 
towards Lg is ignored. Now as P increases, given Lg  and Lz , X must increase and Y  must 
go down. 
 



















               
      








 and ∆ = [w+ Lg. 
wb'(Lz)] >0 implies that the RHS in (14) is increasing in Lz. ∆ guarantees the stability of 
equilibrium Lz. As P goes up and consequently Lz, X goes up further and Y shrinks due to 
Rybczynski argument. Thus relative supply of X increases with P and we close the 




Now we need to chalk out how Lz may get affected in order to understand the role 
of government bureaucracy in enhancing the volume of trade when corruption is being 
endogenous. Higher “unproductive expenditure” incurred due to corruption or regulatory 
control are reflected through a higher β or Lg. In case, greater Lg implies positive pro-




possibility is always there that regulations and complex layers of decision making may 
increase transaction costs and induce corruption, α (Lg) should be increasing in  Lg .   
 
Let us derive the effect of a change in β and Lg on Lz from (14). 
Differentiating (14) with respect to β and Lg  for a given P and using envelope condition 
we get, 
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. We discuss both the possibilities now. When Lg increases, α can go up or down. 
Suppose, α goes down i.e. 0 < ′ α . The RHS in (14) will increase for a given w, reducing 
Lz in order to balance both sides. But with more productive activity factor returns 
improve. Therefore as w increases, Lz needs to fall further. This is captured in (17). If α' 














suggests that a more productive bureaucracy must imply a smaller size of corruption 
related activities. 













  can be negative. This happens iff 
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dLg
dw



















 Therefore, we can write down the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION III: 
a)  Higher β will increase  Lz for a given P and Lg  
b)  Higher Lg will reduce Lz  for a given P and β provided α' <0 
c)  Higher Lg may increase Lz for a given P and β provided α' >0 
Proof: see the discussion above and see Appendix C for mathematical details. 
               
  Note that whenever both Lg and Lz  go up for a given P, X must go up and Y should 
decline. Therefore, for a given P, relative supply of X increases driving down the autarkic 
relative price. Thus a relatively corrupt economy will have an export bias in favor of the 
capital intensive good. Hence as we have shown in the benchamark model, if a labor 
abundant economy has a greater β or  Lg , its autarkic relative price of the labor intensive 
good will be higher compared to no-corruption case. Hence, corruption bias will go 
against the factor-endowment bias curtailing the volume of trade.                    
 If    α' <0 and 
dLg
dw
 are strong enough Lz will fall when Lg goes up. In this case, there 
is a possibility that when Lg goes up, (Lz+Lg) may go down increasing relative supply of Y 
and hence increasing P. This is a case where more productive bureaucracy promotes 
export in labor-intensive good and increases the volume of trade. 
   It is possible that as Lg goes beyond a level, α responds positively to increasing 
Lg. Therefore, the relative price of the labor intensive good may go down following the 
initial rise in Lg and then will go up eventually. For a relatively labor abundant economy, 
a relatively productive bureaucracy will promote trade, but eventually trade gets 
restricted with bulging bureaucracy.  
   Figure 3 captures the possibility. D denotes the difference between the world 
and local (autarkic) relative price of the labor-intensive good. Let ⎯Lg denote that level of  




on the autarkic production bundle. Increase in D represents greater volume of trade. 
Hence volume of trade for the labor-abundant economy increases with Lg initially and 
then drops. 
 
  The analysis in this section corroborates our earlier claim with a constant α. 
Corruption led transaction costs either in terms of a higher β or rising Lg will generally 
lead to a higher Lz. This will work against the factor-endowment bias in a typical labor-
abundant country, restricting the volume of trade. For a capital-abundant country the 
result will be exactly opposite. 
  One important characteristic of trade between two countries, identical in every 
respect except differing in terms of Lg and β is that under free trade factor prices do not 
equalize. β or Lg acts as a productivity parameter and under free trade both w and r are 
likely to be lower in a country with higher β  and/or  Lg. As opportunity for international 
factor mobility arises, both labor and capital will be inclined to flow out of the more 
corrupt economy. Also to be noted is the fact that as a labor-abundant country engages in 
trade, the relative price of the labor-intensive good increases, leading to a lower Lz and a 
smaller size of the Z sector or a cut back in activities involving the corrupt segment of the 
economy. But at the same time the earning of a typical bureaucrat increases with an 
increase in w as well as an increase in wb(Lz). However, as long as the elasticity of  wb 





The purpose of this paper is to model corruption as a labor-intensive activity 
within a simple general equilibrium framework and then explain the relationship between 
international trade and corruption. We argue that the standard HOSV framework provides 
some insights regarding such a relationship. Corruption is a labor-intensive activity. 
Hence, as more labor is attracted to this sector, labor-intensive traded good suffers, so 
does the volume of trade for the labor-abundant economy. This shows that even if 




The scenario in the paper is one where the labor-abundant economy suffers from 
corruption, but not the capital –abundant one. A corrupt capital-abundant nation is likely 
to trade more than under the usual “non-corruption” case. Thus corruption leading to 
greater volume of trade is a distinct possibility. Moreover, our results indicate that there 
may be a case when in a labor-abundant economy exports are really capital intensive and 
a large chunk of the labor force is absorbed in the extra-legal non-traded activities.  
 
However, if labor is assumed to be immobile between production and corruption 
activities volume of trade as well as the natural endowment bias will remain unaffected 
due to a change in the degree of corruption. Labor immobility insulates the production 
sector from any shock stemming from corruption. This phenomenon is explained in 
Appendix D.  
 
If corruption leads to the relative global abundance of capital-intensive good it 
hurts welfare of a capital-abundant economy. Therefore, such a nation will always 
despise corruption, a reason grounded in economic reality without much of a moral 
connotation. Once engaged in trade the labor-abundant country may not mind being more 
corrupt. Since corruption leads to improvement of its terms of trade. In the extended 
model the welfare loss due to greater corruption has to be weighed against the terms of 
trade gain due to greater production of capital-intensive good. We may also have a 
critical level of government bureaucracy for which it is optimum in raising the volume of 















1.  Chan (2006) looks at the role of property rights and comparative advantage. Although similar in 
spirit, he does not deal with the factor-endowment approach.   
2.  Analysis of corruption and related distortion in open economies starts with Krueger (1974) and 
Bhagwati (1982).  Later papers by Hillman and Ursprung (1988, 1996) introduced explicit 
political economy angle to the trade related problems. Hillman (2003) summarizes research in this 
area. More recently Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2007), bring in the issue of corruption and trade 
reform in the context of a developing economy. 
3.  A paper by Lui ( 1985 ) is an interesting reference on this. 
4.  Interested readers may look into Jones (1965) for more detailed analysis and mathematical 
calculations. 
5.  Initial α  may not be necessarily 0. Without losing the essence of the model we can think of any 





               and that of   P ˆ Δ  would be                                              .            
 
 Here, “ a” captures the effect that as α  increases more payment goes to corrupt sector. Note that 
1 0 ≤ ≤ a . If we start from no-corruption level, a=0.  One can check that this will provide us 
with the same result. 
6.    Welfare implication of a change in the degree of corruption in our benchmark model is provided in 
Appendix B. 
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Appendix  A 
Differentiating and manipulating equation (2) and (3) we get, 
(1.A)                    () P r w ˆ ˆ ˆ = + − θ θ            














 =(θKX – θKY  ) = ( ) LX LY θ θ −                       
  And,   ⇒ Li θ  value share of L in i
th commodity, i= X and Y 
  ⇒ Ki θ   value share of K in i
th commodity, i= X and Y 
Therefore,           





ˆ ˆ = −               
  Here, θ >0 because commodity X is K-intensive. 
Solving for w ˆ  we get, 























1 < 0 
Therefore,  
(3.A)  P w ˆ ˆ θ − =                        












1   
 here, θ>0 (Stolper-Samuelson result) 
Differentiating equation (4) and (5) and manipulating them one gets, 
(4.A)             Lz z L L K Y X λ ψ ψ ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( + − = −                          
           here,  , 0 > ψ  due to Rybczynski’s effect.  
 
From equation (6) 
     (5.A) 
  Here,   P V ˆ ˆ λ =    and  λ is the share of X in national income. 
Therefore,  
(6.A)  
From homothetic demand function, (6.A) and (4.A) what we have, 
Z L P V d ˆ ˆ ˆ + − = + θ α
) ( ˆ ˆ θ λ α + + = P d LZ
[ ]
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 (7.A)     
                                                                                                     
where,  D σ  implies demand elasticity. 
  Hence proposition I is proved. 
So the difference in autarkic price level relative to benchmark no-corruption level is 
given by, 
(8.A) 
                                 
  Hence proposition II is proved. 
 
Appendix  B 
The utility that a consumer gets depends on consumption demand for X and Y. 
(1.B)   () D D Y X U U , =            





 we get, 


















∂          
LHS of the previous equation is the change in utility expressed in terms of units of Y. We 
can call it change in real income or welfare in Y units. Let us denote it by  Ω d . Therefore 







d + = Ω  
Hence, 
(3.B)     D D PdX dY d + = Ω         
 We also know that the budget constraint is, 
(4.B)   PX Y PX Y D D + = +           
Differentiating we have, 
dP X PdX dY dP X PdX dY D D D . . + + = + +  
Or,  dP X dP X PdX dY PdX dY D D D . . − + + = +  
Or, ) ( . X X dP PdX dY PdX dY D D D − − + = +  
[]














 (5.B)    ) ( ) ( . PdX dY X X dP d D + + − − = Ω        
The first term of the RHS represents Terms of Trade (TOT) effect whereas the second 
term signifies the change in the value of total production or change in production bundle. 
 
Any change in welfare due to change in the degree of corruption comes through TOT 
change and change in the production bundle.  
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We know that    0 <
α d
dP












 is also negative as a rise in the degree of corruption leads to lowering the 
value of total production in labor-abundant country. An increase in α reduces both w and 
r. 
 
Therefore TOT effect is positive for a labor-abundant country when degree of 
corruption increases. However, there is an inefficiency effect since greater corruption 
reduces value of production and retained earnings of the factor owners. Such a trade-off 
is absent in the capital-abundant country. An increase in corruption worsens its terms of 
trade and also leads to direct income loss.  
 
APPENDIX  C 
Differentiating equation (14) w.r.t. P 
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here,    and    0 <
dP
dw




Setting  (PdX+dY) =0 from envelope condition we get, 
 




















              
 
















g g . . . . . + = +  
 







Y X P L
d
dL g z α
β
               
Differentiating equation (14) w.r.t. β , for a given P  and using envelope condition one 
we have, 











































  (4.C)                         
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APPENDIX  D 
Without losing generality we can make following changes in the benchmark 
model. There are two types of labor in the economy, say, L1 and Lz. Lz is different from L1 
. L1 is absorbed in the production of X and Y and return to L1 is w1 but Lz get employment 
due to institutional complexities involved in licensing and international trade and thses 
laborers get wz as wage.  

























1 < 0 




(1.D)      () P w ˆ ˆ 1 θ − =                           
Equation (5.A) of Appendix A will become 
(2.D)  
  Therefore,                                                                               
 (3.D)       













;  g′>o  to capture the effect of 
mobility.    
Therefore,   










− − =                   
where φ  is the elasticity of labor-mobility function.  
From  (4.D) and (3.D) one gets, 


























                                
Using homothetic demand, labor mobility function and equation (5.D) and 
manipulating we get the value of P ˆ as 














































Lz z Y L X L
D
L
d L L K
P     
where,  λL1Y = share of labor engaged in Y production, λL1X = share of labor engaged in X 
production and  λLz = share of labor engaged in corruption acitivity. 
 
Putting 0 = φ  we have the in difference autarkic price level relative to benchmark 
no-corruption level as, 
(7.D)                 Δ P ˆ = 0                                   
Z L w V d z ˆ ˆ ˆ + = + α
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